In this engaging and meticulously researched volume, John A. Adams reexamines the decisions made by Dwight D. Eisenhower and his staff in the crucial months leading up to the Battle of the Bulge. In late August 1944, Allied tanks chased the remnants of the German army from France, and defeat of the Wehrmacht seemed assured. On December 16, however, German tanks tore into the Americans in the Ardennes and made for the Meuse. Conventional wisdom says that Eisenhower's "Broad Front" strategy had caused his armies to stall in early September, thus giving the Germans the breather they needed. Ike's subsequent failure to concentrate his forces in the battles of October and November brought about deadlock and opened the way for the German counterattack. Arguing to the contrary, Adams demonstrates that Eisenhower and his staff at SHAEF had a good campaign strategy that was refined to reflect current developments and that it had an excellent chance of destroying the Germans west of the Rhine. Adams's view may be controversial, but his careful attention to the documentary evidence and closely argued strategic analysis is sure to engage the armchair strategist.