Financial Crisis Management and the Pursuit of Power

Doyran (economics, City U. of New York) explores the dynamic between state power and crisis management, specifically by examining US policy responses to three relatively financial crises that feature the US. Specifically, she looks at the 1998 US hedge fund collapse, the 2000-2002 high tech bubble and Enron scandal, and the recent home mortgage crisis with systematic failures in financial institutions (2007-2010). She looks at the systemic causes, the role of the state (first two "liberal lassez-faire" cases and then a "liberal interventionist") and crisis management arrangements. She takes issue with essentialist narratives of US hegemony in the post-war era and the Bretton Woods system, critically examining realist, liberal interventionist and marxist models, and additionally argues that post-1970 financial literature failed to detect the contradictions in the emerging international financial system. The book also rejects the state-centric view that financial stability requires a strongly interventionist state and argues that there is a trend of government regulatory interventions creating bigger crises that in turn demand bigger interventions, leading to excessive competitiveness and financial instability. To that end, she documents the trend of "financialization" in the US economy since the 1970s. Annotation c2011 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Mine Aysen Doyran, Ph.D., Assistant Professor (full-time faculty member), Department of Economics & Business, The City University of New York (CUNY)/Lehman College, USA