These essays explore the discourse on war in Germany and the United States between 1871 and 1914 - in the era bounded by the mid-century wars in Europe and North America and the First World War. The concept of 'total war', which was prefigured in aspects of the earlier conflicts and realized in 1914, provides the analytical focus. The essays reveal vigorous discussions of warfare in several forums - among soldiers, statesmen, women's groups and educators - on both sides of the Atlantic. Predictions of long, cataclysmic wars were not uncommon in these discussions, while the involvement of German and American soldiers in colonial warfare suggested that future combat would not spare civilians. Despite these 'anticipations of total war', virtually no one drew the practical implications in planning for war in the early twentieth century.
This book on the Treaty of Versailles constitutes a new synthesis of peace conference scholarship. It illuminates events from the armistice in 1918 to the signing of the treaty in 1919, scrutinizing the motives, actions and constraints that informed decision-making by the French, American and English politicians who bore the principal responsibility for drafting the peace settlement. It also addresses German reactions to the draft treaty and the final agreement, as well as Germany's role in the immediate postwar period. The findings call attention to diverging peace aims within the American and Allied camps and underscore the degree to which the negotiators themselves considered the Versailles Treaty a work in progress. A detailed examination of the proceedings from the point of view of the main protagonists forms the core of the investigation.
The Council of Four--Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando--was formed at Wilson's suggestion to consider a number of major questions revolving around the Paris Peace Conference. This work com
