In cognitive science, conceptual content is frequently understood as the "meaning" of a mental representation. This position raises largely empirical questions about what
In cognitive science, conceptual content is frequently understood as the"meaning" of a mental representation. This position raises largely empirical questionsabout what concepts are, what form they ta
In Things and Places, Zenon Pylyshyn argues that the process of incrementallyconstructing perceptual representations, solving the binding problem (determining which propertiesgo together), and, more g
In Things and Places, Zenon Pylyshyn argues that the process of incrementallyconstructing perceptual representations, solving the binding problem (determining which propertiesgo together), and, more g
In Seeing and Visualizing, Zenon Pylyshyn argues that seeing is different from thinking and that to see is not, as it may seem intuitively, to create an inner replica of the world. Pylyshyn examines h
Few areas of study have led to such close and intense interactions among computer scientists, psychologists, and philosophers as the area now referred to as cognitive science. Within this discipline,
The question, "What is Cognitive Science?" is often asked but seldom answered to anyone's satisfaction. Until now, most of the answers have come from the new breed of philosophers of mind. This book,
The chapters in this book have evolved from talks originally presented at The First International Workshop on Human and Machine Cognition. Although the workshop took place in1989, the papers that appe
