An illustrated study of the development and operations of coalition and Afghan Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan from 2009 until the problematic withdrawal in 2022. At the end of 2008, the clearly inadequate strength of the coalition's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan prompted the US and NATO to deploy troops in numbers that could not be sustained long-term. This shortfall was overcome in 2009, when a newly created Special Forces command (ANASOC) in the Afghan National Army began to partner with the ISAF to undertake counter-insurgency operations against the Taliban, Al Quaeda and ISIL-K. However, while the burden of operations never diminished, many NATO countries reduced their contribution from 2012 onwards, leading to an over-ambitious expansion of ANASOC and weaker ties between it and US/NATO command. In this engaging study, former United States Marine Corps officer John Parkinson draws on first-hand experience to examine how this series of event
