Moral Psychology ─ The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness

For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways.In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers fromincorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophershave drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology toinform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and thesevolumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists inthis emerging interdisciplinary field. The contributors to volume 1 discuss recent work on theevolution of moral beliefs, attitudes, and emotions. Each chapter includes an essay, comments on theessay by other scholars, and a reply by the author(s) of the original essay. Topics include aversion of naturalism that avoids supposed fallacies, distinct neurocomputational systems fordeontic reasoning, the evolutionary psychology of moral sentiments regarding incest, the sexualselection of moral virtues, the evolution of symbolic thought, and arguments both for and againstinnate morality. Taken together, the chapters demonstrate the value for both philosophy andpsychology of collaborative efforts to understand the many complex aspects of morality.ContributorsWilliam Casebeer, Leda Cosmides, Oliver Curry, Michael Dietrich, Catherine Driscoll, Susan Dwyer,Owen Flanagan, Jerry Fodor, Gilbert Harman, Richard Joyce, Debra Lieberman, Ron Mallon, JohnMikhail, Geoffrey Miller, Jesse Prinz, Peter Railton, Michael Ruse, Hagop Sarkissian, WalterSinnott-Armstrong, Chandra Sekhar Sripada, Valerie Tiberius, John Tooby, Peter Tse, KathleenWallace, Arthur Wolf, David Wong Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Professor of Philosophy and HardyProfessor of Legal Studies at Dartmouth College.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Professor of Philosophy and Hardy Professor of Legal Studies at Dartmouth College.