商品簡介
"A thoroughly researched, powerful, and important study about the role of intelligence in British rearmament and diplomatic policy during the 1930s. The tale Wark tells is a depressing but familiar one. The intelligence community in London was divided by bureaucratic frontiers and its vision distorted by its own preconceptions. Crucial policymakers, such as Neville Chamberlain, used intelligence merely to buttress their own preconceived notions, discarding whatever was inconventient. British intelligence agencies first badly underestimated German rearmament, then wildly overestimated, it; on the eve of war, the British swung about again, and decided, largely as a matter of faith, that they would win. All the ingredients of classic intelligence failures are described in Wark's account, which concludes that intelligence, even when accurate, will rarely defeat the tendency to believe what one wants to believe." ---Choice
"A first-rate study on the role of intelligence assessments in Britain's foreign and defense policies during the 1930s. By examining a mass of unpublished material in archival collections, Wark has skillfully reconstructed the intelligence pictures presented to British decision makers on German rearmament and intentions."---Orbis
"This work is a penetrating analysis of the role of British intelligence services in assessing the threat posed by Hitler's Third Reich during the 1930s, and the accuracy of their evaluations of Germany's aims and capabilities." ---Cryptologia
"The Ultimate Enemy is unusually rich in its contents and will certainly become essential reading for those interested in British appeasement policies. But Wark's reading of the major intelligence failures of this period has a wider applicability." ---Times Literary Supplement
作者簡介
Wesley K. Wark is Associate Professor of History at the University of Toronto.
