Between Hobbes's Leviathan and Smith's Invisible Hand

In this short essay, Buskens (empirical legal studies, Erasmus U. Rotterdam, the Netherlands) explores trust issues in contractual exchanges through an investigation of why people require differing levels of contract--from the casual exchanges of tools between neighbors to the complex contracts that characterize buying and selling a house--and a discussion of efficiency, or the question of whether there are transactions in which contracting is more or less extensive than necessary to discipline actors in the relevant trust situation. In an interdisciplinary manner that he urges other legal scholars to adopt, he addresses the economic, psychological, social, and legal factors that determine trust in transactions and the ways in which they affect the use of contracting or other forms of regulation. He also discusses complementary empirical research designs that can aid in understanding the efficiency of such transactions. Distributed in North America by ISBS. Annotation c2011 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)