Real Natures And Familiar Objects

In Real Natures and Familiar Objects Crawford Elder defends, with qualifications, theontology of common sense. He argues that we exist -- that no gloss is necessary for the statement"human beings exist" to show that it is true of the world as it really is -- and that we aresurrounded by many of the medium-sized objects in which common sense believes. He argues furtherthat these familiar medium-sized objects not only exist, but have essential properties, which we areoften able to determine by observation. The starting point of his argument is that ontology shouldoperate under empirical load -- that is, it should give special weight to the objects and propertiesthat we treat as real in our best predictions and explanations of what happens in the world. Eldercalls this presumption "mildly controversial" because it entails that arguments are needed forcertain widely assumed positions such as "mereological universalism" (according to which the sum ofrandomly assembled objects constitutes an object in its own right).Elder begins by defending realismabout essentialness (arguing that nature's objects have essential properties whose status asessential is mind-independent). He then defends this view of familiar objects against causalexclusion arguments and worries about vagueness. Finally, he argues that many of the objects inwhich common sense believes really exist, including artifacts and biological devices shaped bynatural selection, and that we too exist, as products of natural selection.

Crawford L. Elder is Head of the Philosophy Department and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut.