Fuzziness, Democracy, Control and Collective Decision-choice System ― A Theory on Political Economy of Rent-seeking and Profit-harvesting

This volume presents an analysis of the problems and solutions of the market mockery of the democratic collective decision-choice system with imperfect information structure composed of defective and deceptive structures using methods of fuzzy rationality.

The book is devoted to the political economy of rent-seeking, rent-protection and rent-harvesting to enhance profits under democratic collective decision-choice systems. The toolbox used in the monograph consists of methods of fuzzy decision, approximate reasoning, negotiation games and fuzzy mathematics. The monograph further discusses the rent-seeking phenomenon in the Schumpeterian and Marxian political economies where the rent-seeking activities transform the qualitative character of the general capitalism into oligarchic socialism and making the democratic collective decision-choice system as an ideology rather than social calculus for resolving conflicts in preferences in the collective decision-choice space without violence.