Contrasting with the US authorities' decisive action, the European Union (EU) seemed largely absent from the 2015 FIFA corruption saga. Even though the EU has established itself as an actor in its own right in international sports governance, there is still a lack of clarity over its capabilities to control sport governing bodies (SGBs). By employing a triangular principal-agent model, and by focusing on the case of EU control of FIFA and UEFA, this book demonstrates that the EU holds significant opportunities to control SGBs through both law and policy. There are, however, important limits as well. EU institutional features complicate control, but do not render the EU powerless. Most importantly, though, SGBs can deploy a variety of strategies to mitigate control. Activating and mitigating control within a triangular set-up involving FIFA and UEFA, their political and football principals, and their EU supervisors will dictate whether or not FIFA and UEFA can expect their autonomy to be curtailed if and when they break from good governance practices.
