On the Psychology of Military Incompetence

The Crimea, the Boer War, the Somme, Tobruk, Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs: these are just some of the milestones in a century and a half of military incompetence, of costly mishaps and tragic blunders. Are these simple accidentsas the bloody fool” theory has itor are they inevitable?

The psychologist Norman Dixon argues that there is a pattern to inept generalship, a pattern he locates within the very act of creating armies in the first place, which in his view produces a levelling down of human capability that encourages the mediocre and limits the gifted. A classic study of military leadership, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence is both an original exploration of infamous modern battles and an essential guide for the next generation of military leaders.

Dr. Norman F. Dixon, M.B.E., Fellow of the British Psychological Society, is Professor Emeritus of Psychology at University College London. After ten years' commission in the Royal Engineers, during which time he was wounded (largely through my own incompetence”), Dixon left the Army in 1950 and entered university where he obtained a first-class degree in Psychology. He received the degrees of Doctor of Philosophy in 1956 and Doctor of Science in 1972, and in 1974 was awarded the University of London Carpenter Medal 'for work of exceptional distinction in Experimental Psychology'.