Counterinsurgency, Security Forces, and the Identification Problem ― Distinguishing Friend from Foe

This book provides a theory and empirical evidence for how security forces can identify militant suspects during counterinsurgency operations, and makes uses of three detailed case studies from US military interventions.

The author offers a causal theory explaining the successful or failed identification of suspected militants during counterinsurgency operations. Whether or not security forces privilege civilian safety increases or decreases the likelihood of positive identification of suspected militants. For military practitioners, the work illustrates the critical precursor to establishing "security" during counterinsurgency operations. The book also examines the role and limits of modern technology in solving the identification problem. The author uses US behavior during the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines; the Marines Corps' Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam; and special operations forces during the Iraq war to showcase the theory.

Among many alternatives, the pivotal factor in a counterinsurgency is security force behavior. In the theory, security force behavior increases or decreases the likelihood of positive identification of suspected militants. Risk-acceptant methods are more likely to lead to identification of militants whereas risk-averse methods often fail. The key distinction between the two methods is whether a security force privileges civilian safety. If government forces are willing to risk their personal safety it signals a credible commitment to the population. The deed of ensuring each citizen's survival initiates the credible commitment between a security force and population because civilians can be protected from reprisals if they collaborate. Owing to mutual dependence, civilians have incentives to provide identifying information on militants. On the other hand, risk averse methods place the protection of soldiers ahead of the safety of civilians. Because government forces have no interest in bearing costs, they fail to establish a credible commitment with the population and dismiss the demands of the identification problem. Paradoxically, the theory gives an account for why and how increased risk to security forces in the short-term actually improves civilian security over the long-run. Ultimately, the book's findings inform debates concerning the costs and risks of foreign intervention and conduct of counterinsurgency.

This book will be of interest to students of counterinsurgency, military history, strategic studies, US foreing policy and security studies in general. 

Lt Col Dan Magruder, Jr,?has a Phd in political science from the University of Chicago, USA, and?is currently Deployed Group Commander and Director of Operations, 22nd Special Tactics Squadron, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA, USA.?