Being We：Phenomenological Contributions to Social Ontology

What does it take to constitute a we with others and how does feeling, thinking, and acting as part of a we, transform one''s sense of self, one''s relation to others, and the way one experiences the world? Is individual subjectivity something that necessarily requires a communal grounding or does a we-relationship always presuppose a plurality of pre-existing selves? What kind of understanding of and relation to others is required if a we is to emerge? Questions regarding the ontological, epistemological, and social character of we is not only of contemporary societal relevance, but are also questions that were intensively discussed by early phenomenological philosophers such as Husserl, Reinach, Stein, Scheler, Walther, Gurwitsch, and Schutz.Drawing on and engaging with ideas and distinctions found in these historical resources, Being We combines historical scholarship and systematic theorizing. It breaks new ground by interweaving work on selfhood and first-personal experience, social cognition, and collective intentionality, offers a much-needed cross fertilization between philosophy and theoretical considerations in the social sciences (sociology, anthropology, and social psychology), and provides a novel account of the complex interrelation between we, you, and I.