As AI systems become increasingly agentic, the central problem is no longer only how to optimize a model, but how to design environments in which multiple intelligent agents interact, compete, cooperate, reveal information, form contracts, and respond strategically to rules. Games, Incentives, and Mechanism Design for AI Agents develops the mathematical foundations needed to understand and engineer these interactions.
Beginning with strategic-form and extensive-form games, equilibrium, learning in games, and repeated interaction, the book builds toward mechanism design, auctions and markets, contracts and delegation, information design, elicitation, and strategic communication. It then turns to problems specific to modern AI systems: learned mechanisms, strategic data, bounded and behaviorally imperfect agents, multi-agent evaluation, and institutional design for populations of AI agents.
The emphasis throughout is on the connection between mathematical structure and the actual AI pipeline. Incentive compatibility, regret, welfare, information asymmetry, commitment, and equilibrium are linked to model training, preference and reward elicitation, agent evaluation, tool and resource allocation, marketplaces, multi-agent protocols, and deployment-time governance. Formal results are paired with geometric, economic, and algorithmic intuition so that the reader can see not only what the mathematics says, but why it matters for AI system design.
Written for graduate students, researchers, and technically sophisticated practitioners, this volume bridges game theory and mechanism design with the emerging engineering of autonomous and language-model-based agents. Its goal is not merely to analyze strategic behavior, but to show how incentives and institutions can become first-class components in the design of intelligent systems.
Core positioning: a graduate-level mathematical treatment of strategic interaction and institutional design for AI-agent systems.