Introduction to JavaScript Object Notation

Brian Skyrms presents a fascinating exploration of how fundamental signals are to our world. He uses a variety of tools -- theories of signaling games, information, evolution, and learning -- to inves

Brian Skyrms presents a fascinating exploration of how fundamental signals are to our world. He uses a variety of tools -- theories of signaling games, information, evolution, and learning -- to inves

Brian Skyrms constructs a theory of "dynamic deliberation" and uses it to investigate rational decisionmaking in cases of strategic interaction. This illuminating book will be of great interest to all

In this new edition of Evolution of the Social Contract, Brian Skyrms uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the genesis of social contracts and investigates social phenomena including justice, communication, altruism, and bargaining. Featuring new material on evolution and information transfer, and including recent developments in game theory and evolution literature, his book introduces and applies appropriate concepts of equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics, showing how key issues can be modeled as games and considering the ways in which evolution sometimes supports, and sometimes does not support, rational choice. He discusses topics including how bargaining with neighbors promotes sharing of resources, the diversity of behavior in ultimatum bargaining in small societies, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and an investigation into signaling games and the spontaneous emergence of meaningful communication. His book will be of great interest to readers in philosophy of science, social scienc

In this new edition of Evolution of the Social Contract, Brian Skyrms uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the genesis of social contracts and investigates social phenomena including justice, communication, altruism, and bargaining. Featuring new material on evolution and information transfer, and including recent developments in game theory and evolution literature, his book introduces and applies appropriate concepts of equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics, showing how key issues can be modeled as games and considering the ways in which evolution sometimes supports, and sometimes does not support, rational choice. He discusses topics including how bargaining with neighbors promotes sharing of resources, the diversity of behavior in ultimatum bargaining in small societies, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and an investigation into signaling games and the spontaneous emergence of meaningful communication. His book will be of great interest to readers in philosophy of science, social scienc

Brian Skyrms presents eighteen essays which apply adaptive dynamics (of cultural evolution and individual learning) to social theory. Altruism, spite, fairness, trust, division of labor, and signaling

Brian Skyrms presents eighteen essays which apply adaptive dynamics (of cultural evolution and individual learning) to social theory. Altruism, spite, fairness, trust, division of labor, and signaling

Brian Skyrms presents a set of influential essays on the nature of quantity, probability, coherence, and induction. The first part explores the nature of quantity and includes essays on tractarian nom

Brian Skyrms presents a set of influential essays on the nature of quantity, probability, coherence, and induction. The first part explores the nature of quantity and includes essays on tractarian nom