本書運用經濟學、概率論、優化理論、博弈理論等方法和技術構建供應鏈系統橫縱向需求信息共享的數學模型，通過研究系統結構、信息結構、市場競爭等因素對橫向及縱向需求信息共享的驅動作用、橫向與縱向需求信息共享的內在聯繫以及需求信息共享對供應鏈企業和供應鏈系統的價值等，探究供應鏈系統中橫縱向需求信息共享的內在驅動機制，為我國企業更加合理地的制定信息共享策略提供決策依據，促進供應鏈企業之間建立緊密的協作關係，降低需求不確定性因素對各企業的最優決策和供應鏈系統最優運行狀態的影響。We investigate information flow in two-tier supply chains, where retailers order from suppliers and sell in a market with uncertain demand. The retailers each have access to a demand signal and can exchange signals (horizontal information sharing). The suppliers can offer the retailers differential payments to gain access to their signals . We demonstrate that retailer competition is a necessary condition to sustain information flow, whereas supplier competition precludes vertical information acquisition. Facing horizontal competition, the retailers can have an incentive to exchange signals if competition is less intense; and this incentive is stronger when they order from independent suppliers than when they order from a monopolist supplier
