WITTGENSTEIN - RULES, GRAMMAR AND NECESSITY 2E - VOLUME 2 OF AN ANALYTICAL COMMENTARY ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

The Second Edition of Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity (the second volume of the landmark analytical commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations) now includes extensively revised and supplemented coverage of the Wittgenstein's complex and controversial remarks on following rules.
Includes thoroughly rewritten essays and the addition of one new essay on communitarian and individualist conceptions of rule-following
Includes a greatly expanded essay on Wittgenstein's conception of logical, mathematical and metaphysical necessity
Features updates to the textual exegesis as the result of taking advantage of the search engine for the Bergen edition of the Nachlass
Reflects the results of scholarly debates on rule-following that have raged over the past 20 years

G. P. Baker was a Fellow of St John's College, Oxford from 1967 until his death in 2002. He is the co-author with P.M.S. Hacker of the first two volumes of the four-volume Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, 1980–96), author of Wittgenstein, Frege and the Vienna Circle (Blackwell, 1988) and, with Katherine Morris, of Descartes' Dualism (1996). He also wrote numerous articles on Wittgenstein, Frege, Russell, Waismann and Descartes.
P. M. S. Hacker is the leading authority on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. He is author of the four-volume Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, the first two volumes co-authored with G.P. Baker (Blackwell, 1980–96) and of Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-century Analytic Philosophy (Blackwell, 1996). His recent works include The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, 2003) and History of Cognitive Neuroscience (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), both co-authored with M. R. Bennett. Most recently he has published Human Nature: The Categorial Framework (Blackwell, 2007), the first volume of a trilogy on human nature. Together with Joachim Schulte, he has produced the 4th edition and extensively revised translation of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).

The authors showed in the first volume that they had in full measure the combination of scholarship and philosophical excellence needed to expound and illuminate the intricacies of the text. That combination is apparent on every page of the present work.’
—Bede Rundle, Philosophical Investigations
‘This second volume has all the scholarly virtues of its predecessor. It is imbued with massive learning. The exegeses are accurate. The essays usefully distinguish the different threads in Wittgenstein’s discussion; they explicate the most significant of the relevant concepts, and they explain the philosophical importance of the issues involved.’
—Malcolm Budd, Philosophical Books

Acknowledgements.
Introduction to Volume 2.
Abbreviations.
ANALYTICALCOMMENTARY.
I Two fruits upon one tree.
1. The continuation of the Early Draft into philosophy of mathematics.
2. Hidden isomorphism.
3. A common methodology.
4. The flatness of philosophical grammar.
FOLLOWINGA RULE§§185–242.
Introduction to the exegesis.
II Rules and grammar.
1. The Tractatusand rules of logical syntax.
2. From logical syntax to philosophical grammar.
3. Rules and rule-formulations.
4. Philosophy and grammar.
5. The scope of grammar.
6. Some morals.
Exegesis§§185–8.
III Accord with a rule.
1. Initial compass bearings.
2. Accord and the harmony between language and reality.
3. Rules of inference and logical machinery.
4. Formulations and explanations of rules by examples.
5. Interpretations, fitting and grammar.
6. Further misunderstandings.
Exegesis §§189–202.
IV Following rules, mastery of techniques, and practices.
1. Following a rule.
2. Practices and techniques.
3. Doing the right thing and doing the same thing.
4. Privacy and the community view.
5. On not digging below bedrock.
V Private linguists and ‘private linguists’ – Robinson Crusoe sails again.
1. Is a language necessarily shared with a community of speakers?
2. Innate knowledge of a language.
3. Robinson Crusoe sails again.
4. Solitary cavemen and monologuists.
5. Private languages and ‘private languages’.
6. Overview.
Exegesis§§203–37.
VI Agreement in definitions, judgements and forms of life.
1. The scaffolding of facts.
2. The role of our nature.
3. Forms of life.
4. Agreement: consensus of human beings and their actions.
Exegesis§§238–42.
VII Grammar and necessity.
1. Setting the stage.
2. Leitmotifs.
3. External guidelines.
4. Necessary propositions and norms of representation.
5. Concerning the truth and falsehood of necessary propositions.
6. What necessary truths are about.
7. Illusions of correspondence: ideal objects, kinds of reality and ultra-physics.
8. The psychology and epistemology of the a priori.
(i) Knowledge.
(ii) Belief.
(iii) Certainty.
(iv) Surprise.
(v) Discoveries and conjectures.
(vi) Compulsion.
9. Propositions of logic and laws of thought.
10. Alternative forms of representation.
11. The arbitrariness of grammar.
12. A kinship to the non-arbitrary.
13. Proof in mathematics.
14. Conventionalism.
Index.