商品簡介
Geirsson (philosophy, Iowa State U.) presents an overview of the debate about the differing cognitive value of coreferential names in light of Frege, Kripke and other philosophers of language. He argues that causal reference theorists are mistaken in eliding the equivalence of different names in statements about belief or attitudes, because names and similar information make reference by way of information networks that do not necessarily coincide. He considers why the way we report attitudes is important, why singular propositions are hard to believe without proper acquaintance with the referred object(s), how different names for the same object draw on different information pertaining to that object, empty names, and why "once the direct reference theorist accepts that one can belief propositions in different ways, she needs to abandon the view that one is justified in believing a proposition simpliciter." Geirsson's exploration of the subject provides a broad picture and is accessible to a large (advanced undergraduate) audience. Annotation c2013 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
作者簡介
Heimir Geirsson is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Iowa State University, USA.
