Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory

Game theory has become an enormously important field of study. It is now a vital methodology for researchers and teachers in many disciplines, including economics, political science, biology, and law. This book provides a thorough introduction to the subject and its applications, at the intermediate level of instruction. It is designed for the upper-division game theory courses that are offered in most undergraduate economics programs and also serves graduate students in economics, political science, law, and business who seek a solid and readable introduction to the theory. The book can be a primary or secondary source for graduate courses that have a significant game-theoretic component.

◎作者：Joel Watson
　任職：University of California, San Diego

Ch 1 Introduction

PART I: REPRESENTATIONS AND BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
Ch 2 The Extensive Form
Ch 3 Strategies and the Normal Form
Ch 4 Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Payoffs
Ch 5 General Assumptions and Methodology

PART II: ANALYZING BEHAVIOR IN STATIC SETTINGS
Ch 6 Dominance and Best Response
Ch 7 Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance
Ch 8 Location, Partnership, and Social Unrest
Ch 9 Nash Equilibrium
Ch10 Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting
Ch11 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Ch12 Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies
Ch13 Contract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings

Part III: ANALYZING BEHAVIOR IN DYNAMIC SETTINGS
Ch14 Details of the Extensive Form
Ch15 Sequential Rationality and Subgame Perfection
Ch16 Topics in Industrial Organization
Ch17 Parlor Games
Ch18 Bargaining Problems
Ch19 Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games
Ch20 Games with Joint Decisions; Negotiation Equilibrium
Ch21 Unverifiable Investment, Hold Up, Options, And Ownership
Ch22 Repeated Games and Reputation
Ch23 Collusion, Trade Agreements, and Goodwill

PART IV: INFORMATION
Ch24 Random Events and Incomplete Information
Ch25 Risk and Incentives in Contracting
Ch26 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability
Ch27 Lemons, Auctions, and Information Aggregation
Ch28 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Ch29 Job-Market Signaling and Reputation