Fairness in Law and Economics

Challenging the belief that fairness runs contrary to the economic analysis of law, this collection reprints 37 articles investigating the impact of fairness perceptions and preferences on legal outcomes and the effectiveness of legal rules, exploring whether law should reconcile fairness and efficiency considerations, and demonstrating the interplay of fairness and efficiency in policy design. Topics include game theory, the demand for punishment, biased judgments of fairness in bargaining, economic costs of inequality, welfare economics, climate change, and income tax theory. The papers were originally published in American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Legal Studies, and Theory for Economic Efficiency as far back as 1979. Annotation c2014 Ringgold, Inc., Portland, OR (protoview.com)

Edited by Lee Anne Fennell, Max Pam Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Research Scholar, University of Chicago Law School, US and Richard H. McAdams, Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law and Aaron Director Research Scholar, University of Chicago Law School, US