Replication in Experimental Economics

The nine chapters in this volume address approaches to the replication of research in experimental economics and the issues involved. Economists from the US and Europe describe their direct replication attempts, including the replication of a sequence of four public goods experiments on sanctions, positive and negative framing, confusion, and MPCR (marginal per capita return) and group size, and replication of an experiment on phone operators taking donations from a public radio station. They discuss replication as a basis for extending others' work in a specific direction, such as McKelvey and Palfrey's centipede game, Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe's investment game, an experiment by List, Berrens, Bohara, and Kerkvliet on voter isolation and preference for giving, the behavioral impact of non-verbal feedback in repeated games, and Eckel and Grossman's analysis of rebate and matching subsidies, as well as ways to encourage replication. Distributed in North America by Turpin Distribution. Annotation c2015 Ringgold, Inc., Portland, OR (protoview.com)