Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion ― How Justice Scalia and Breyer Regulate Regulators

While Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer appear to be polar opposites according to measurements of ideology, legal reasoning, constitutional and statutory interpretation, a review of the cases cited in this volume reveals that their jurisprudence in practice does not necessarily flow from their theoretical and contradictory accounting of judicial review of administration actions. Breyer demanded much of the executive branch, requiring that administrative agencies take a functional approach towards interpreting statutes as well as demanding high levels of agency cooperation and coordination. In contrast, Scalia's literalist approach constrained administrative discretion with regard to agency actions, but left broad discretionary powers to agency inactions. Eight chapters are: regulating the regulators; legal reasoning of Breyer and Scalia; SEC, FDA, and FCC agency actions; environmental agency actions; Department of Labor agency actions; Department of Justice and IRS agency actions; judging the judges; comparing judicial principles with decisions; cases not selected due to legal question(s) unrelated to agency discretion. Annotation c2015 Ringgold, Inc., Portland, OR (protoview.com)