Body and Soul

In the first set Whiting presents Aristotle's conception of the soul as the form and essence of an organic (and so living) body as part of his solution to Presocratic puzzles about whether there is a real (and not simply conventional) distinction between the coming-to-be (or passing-away) of an individual substance and what is merely the alteration or rearrangement of pre-existing stuffs. The solution also involves taking each individual animal within a species to have its own numerically distinct "individual" form, which (unlike species forms traditionally conceived) exists when and only when it does.

The remaining essays account for various deficiencies in the lives of rational animals by appeal to the explanatory asymmetries afforded by Aristotle's teleology, where formal and final causes dominate when things go as they should (teleologically speaking) go, and material-efficient causes dominate when things go wrong. Just as Aristotle traces the birth of females to the failure of menstrual fluid to be fully "mastered" by the formal movements in the father's semen, so too he traces akratic and other defective forms of action to the failure of desires to be fully "mastered" by the activities of reason. Whiting argues that phron瘰is is on this account the proper form of the desiring part of the soul, which (when things go well) is one with the practically reasoning part.