Problems of epistemology in a Wittgensteinian context

The book is a collection of articles on epistemology in the context of Wittgensteinian normative pragmatism/naturalism. In particular, the problem of the definition of knowledge, the Getye problem, the problem of the value of knowledge, the concepts of knowledge-as and phenomenal knowledge are analyzed, anti-random epistemology, Sandi Goldberg's approach based on the notion of epistemically admissible propositions, Ernest Sosa's epistemology of epistemic capacities, Duncan Pritchard's anti-random epistemology of epistemic capacities and his Bayesian approach to the problem of skepticism, Timothy Williamson's first-knowledge epistemology are discussed. First-knowledge-epistemology is favored, and it is argued that it is compatible with the Wittgensteinian approach to knowledge. A definition of knowledge as a true (implicitly or explicitly) justified opinion is proposed, provided that the "epistemic gap" between justification and veridical explanandum is closed within an appropriate "language game."