Great Britain and the American Civil War

he adjournment of Parliament on August 7 without hint of governmen-

tal inclination to act in the American Civil War was accepted by most

of the British public as evidence that the Ministry had no intentions in that

direction. But keen observers were not so confident. Motley, at Vienna,

was keeping close touch with the situation in England through private cor-

respondence. In March, 1862, he thought that "France and England have

made their minds up to await the issue of the present campaign"-meaning

McClellan's advance on Richmond[734]. With the failure of that campaign

he wrote: "Thus far the English Government have resisted his [Napoleon's]

importunities. But their resistance will not last long[735]." Meanwhile the

recently established pro-Southern weekly, The Index, from its first issue,

steadily insisted on the wisdom and necessity of British action to end the

war[736]. France was declared rapidly to be winning the goodwill of the

South at the expense of England; the British aristocracy were appealed to on

grounds of close sympathywith a "SouthernAristocracy"; mediation, atfirst

objected to, in view of the more reasonable demand for recognition, was in

6 EPHRAIM DOUGLASS ADAMS

the end the chief object of The Index, after mid-July, when simple recogni-

tion seemed impossible of attainment[737]. Especially British humiliation

because of the timidity of her statesmen, was harped upon and any public

manifestation of Southern sympathy was printed in great detail[738].

The speculations of Motley, the persistent agitation of The Index are, how-

ever, no indication that either Northern fears or Southern hopes were based

on authoritative information as to governmental purpose. The plan now

in the minds of Palmerston and Russell and their steps in furthering it have

been the subject of much historical study and writing. It is here proposed

to review them in the light of all available important materials, both old and

new, using a chronological order and with more citation than is customary,

in the belief that such citations best tell the story of this, the most critical

period in the entire course of British attitude toward the Civil War. Here,

and here only, Great Britain voluntarily approached the danger of becoming

involved in the American conflict[739].

Among the few who thought the withdrawal of Lindsay's motion, July 18,

and the Prime Minister's comments did not indicate safety for the North

stood Adams, the American Minister. Of Palmerston's speech he wrote the

next day in his diary: "It was cautious and wise, but enough could be gath-

ered from it to show that mischief to us in some shape will only be averted

by the favour of Divine Providence or our own efforts. The anxiety attend-

ing my responsibility is only postponed[740]." At this very moment Adams

was much disturbed by his failure to secure governmental seizure of a war

vessel being built at Liverpool for the South-the famous Alabama-which

was soon completed and put to sea but ten days later, July 29. Russell's delay

in enforcing British neutrality, as Adams saw it, in this matter, reinforcing

the latter's fears of a change in policy, had led him to explain his alarm to

Seward. On August 16 Adams received an instruction, written August 2,

outlining the exact steps to be taken in case the feared change in British pol-

icy should occur. As printed in the diplomatic documents later presented

to Congress this despatch is merely a very interesting if somewhat discur-