Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrrent strategies that have evolved in response to the nuclear revolution and the condition of mutually assured destruction: the strategy of limited retaliation. The author argues that the logic underlying both strategies centres on a search for ways to make the use of force or the threat of its use credible when any use of force might escalate to mutual devastation.
Using colour illustrations and examples from India, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia solutions are provided for urban and suburban living in the tropics as space becomes constrained. Examples are sho
Dr. Powell takes us on a journey beyond the realm of the ego, beyond the illusion of subject and object, good and bad, high and low, to the ground on which the manifest universe rests. This is where
Wisdom is to reject conventional wisdom about almost everything.Thus begins Robert Powell's inquiry into the nature of Totality and the unreality of all else. This small but profound book is divided i
Developed from the A-5 nuclear bomber and used in a reconnaissance role, the RA-5C Vigilante was the largest and fastest aeroplane ever to operate from the deck of an aircraft carrier. During the Viet
Celebrating a century of eurythmy, a modern art of etheric movement In the beginning was the Word . . . and the Word was with God . . . and nothing that was made was made without the Word The human be
Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrrent strategies that have evolved in response to the nuclear revolution and the condition of mutually assured destruction: the strategy of limited retaliation. The author argues that the logic underlying both strategies centres on a search for ways to make the use of force or the threat of its use credible when any use of force might escalate to mutual devastation.
