Accidents are preventable, but only if they are correctly described and understood. Since the mid-1980s accidents have come to be seen as the consequence of complex interactions rather than simple thr
"This book analyses and explains the principles behind Safety-I and Safety-II approaches and considers the past and future of safety management practices. The analysis makes use of common examples and
"This book analyses and explains the principles behind Safety-I and Safety-II approaches and considers the past and future of safety management practices. The analysis makes use of common examples and
Resilience engineering has consistently argued that safety is more than the absence of failures. Since the first book was published in 2006, several book chapters and papers have demonstrated the adva
Accident investigation and risk assessment have for decades focused on the human factor, particularly 'human error'. Countless books and papers have been written about how to identify, classify, elimi
Accident investigation and risk assessment have always focused on the human factor, particularly human error. This bias towards the study of performance failures leads to the assumption that there is
The sheer number of variables of complex dynamic systems do not allow their workings or failures to be understood by linear thinking or standard analytical methods. Hollnagel (U. of Southern Denmark)
Safety-I is defined as the freedom from unacceptable harm. The purpose of traditional safety management is therefore to find ways to ensure this ‘freedom’. But as socio-technical systems steadily have
Safety-I is defined as the freedom from unacceptable harm. The purpose of traditional safety management is therefore to find ways to ensure this ‘freedom’. But as socio-technical systems steadily have
