In Standing up for Philosophy, Jonathan Weinberg and Joshua Alexander seek to radically reformulate the debate over armchair philosophy. Have results in experimental philosophy shown thought-experiments to be so problematic that they should be abandoned? While experimental philosophy seems to indicate that our verdicts on thought-experiments are vulnerable to demographic variation and unconscious contextual influences, philosophers have long struggled to articulate the pessimistic upshot from these vulnerabilities to error. Weinberg and Alexander argue that these debates have been misframed in traditional epistemic terminology, such as whether the method of cases is sufficiently reliable to provide knowledge. The trouble with this framework is that it can't reckon with experimental philosophy's dirty little secret-namely, that the method of cases is probably not in such a bad way that it can't sometimes be put to good use somewhere and somehow. The real question is not 'what's so wron
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