The German 1918 Offensives ― A Case Study of the Operational Level of War

In the first half of 1918, a series of large-scale offensive operations undertaken by German forces produced stunning tactical gains of a sort previously thought impossible in the gridlock of trench warfare. In this volume, Zabecki analyzes original German records from an operational perspective to reveal why these victories failed to add up to overall strategic success. Zabecki holds a PhD in military science from the Royal Military College of Science, Cranfield U. (UK). The text is based upon his dissertation. Annotation c2006 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

David T. Zabecki has been Commanding General of the U.S. Southern European Task Force (Rear) and has served as the U.S. Department of Defense Executive Director for all World War II 60^th anniversary commemoration events in Europe. In 2003 he was the Senior Security Advisor on the U.S. Coordinating and Monitoring Mission in Israel. The Editor of Vietnam Magazine, he has a PhD in Military Science from the Royal Military College of Science.