Sanctions in EU Competition Law ─ Principles and Practice

In the early decades of European integration, the enforcement of EU competition law was highly centralized. Virtually all enforcement actions under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU were initiated by the European Commission. More recently, the enforcement of EU competition law has become less centralized - many would say even decentralized. In 2004, essentially in an effort to increase enforcement capacity in the wake of EU enlargement, the involvement of Member State competition authorities was significantly reinforced by national authorities being given power to pursue infringements of EU competition law, largely on the basis of their domestic enforcement regimes. This combination of decentralization and enforcement autonomy raises questions about the relationship between EU law and national law, as well as about the costs of enforcement. Sanctions in EU Competition Law links these questions by analyzing how competences in the area of sanctions are distributed between EU and national law, and how this influences the costs of enforcement. The author's conclusions - which highlight the economic implications of the choices made by competition authorities, courts, and legislators - will be of use to all the above in further developing EU competition policy. The thesis on which this book is based was declared runner-up in the 2013 Concurrences Awards. (Series: Hart Studies in Competition Law)

Michael J Frese is a fellow at the Amsterdam Centre of European Law and Governance and the Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics and practises law in Brussels.