How We Act

How We Act presents a compelling picture of human action as part of the natural causal order. Berent Enc eschews appeal to special capacities supposedly unique to rational agents, such as agent causation and irreducible acts of volition, and by appealing to analogous positions in epistemology and the theory of perception, shows why its is a mistake to subscribe to such capacities.
Although aspects of the causal theory of action have been adopted and defended by many empiricist philosophers, none has given as sustained and as thorough a defence as Enc offers in this book. His defence begins with a foundationalist definition of action that rests on a theory of basic acts, conceived here as derived from empirical studies of animal behaviour. Basic acts are complex units that agents acquire as part of their repertoire of things they can readily do - things with which practical syllogisms end.
Having set out the details of his causal theory, Enc proceeds to propose solutions for two remaining problems. The first is a general and a complete solution to the problem of deviant causal chains. The second is a solution to the problem of the disappearance of the agent. A causal theory normally presents the agent as a mere conduit for causal action. The agent seems to lose its active role. Enc addresses this problem by contrasting hard-wired and conditioned behaviour with behaviour that is the result of deliberation. He provides a purely causal model of deliberation.
How We Act is careful to allay fears that its causal theory threatens our common-sense notion that we act of our own free will, but it remains highly provocative and original. Anyone working on human action, in philosophy and also in cognitive and behavioural psychology, will find much to stimulate them here.

Berent Enc was formerly Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.