Moral Psychology ― Free Will and Moral Responsibility

Traditional philosophers approached the issues of free will and moral responsibilitythrough conceptual analysis that seldom incorporated findings from empirical science. In recentdecades, however, striking developments in psychology and neuroscience have captured the attentionof many moral philosophers. This volume of Moral Psychology offers essays,commentaries, and replies by leading philosophers and scientists who explain and use empiricalfindings from psychology and neuroscience to illuminate old and new problems regarding free will andmoral responsibility. The contributors -- who include such prominent scholars as PatriciaChurchland, Daniel Dennett, and Michael Gazzaniga -- consider issues raised by determinism,compatibilism, and libertarianism; epiphenomenalism, bypassing, and naturalism; naturalism; andrationality and situationism. These writings show that although science does not settle the issuesof free will and moral responsibility, it has enlivened the field by asking novel, profound, andimportant questions.

ContributorsRoy F. Baumeister, Tim Bayne,Gunnar Bjornsson, C. Daryl Cameron, Hanah A. Chapman, William A. Cunningham, Patricia S. Churchland,Christopher G. Coutlee, Daniel C. Dennett, Ellen E. Furlong, Michael S. Gazzaniga, Patrick Haggard,Brian Hare, Lasana T. Harris, John-Dylan Haynes, Richard Holton, Scott A. Huettel, Robert Kane,Victoria K. Lee, Neil Levy, Alfred R. Mele, Christian Miller, Erman Misirlisoy, P. Read Montague,Thomas Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias, William T. Newsome, B. Keith Payne, Derk Pereboom, Adina L.Roskies, Laurie R. Santos, Timothy Schroeder, Michael N. Shadlen, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ChandraSripada, Christopher L. Suhler, Manuel Vargas, Gideon Yaffe

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Chauncey Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics at Duke University and the editor of the previous volumes of Moral Psychology, all published by the MIT Press.