This Element presents an interpretation and defence of Philippa Foot's ethical naturalism. It begins with the often neglected grammatical method that Foot derives from an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy. This method shapes her approach to understanding goodness as well as the role that she attributes to human nature in ethical judgment. Moral virtues understood as perfections of human powers are central to Foot's account of ethical judgment. The thrust of the interpretation offered here is that Foot's metaethics takes ethical judgment to be tied to our self-understanding as a sort of rational animal. Foot's metaethics thereby offers a compelling contemporary approach that preserves some of the best insights of the Aristotelian tradition in practical philosophy.
Philippa Foot (1920-2010) is widely regarded as one of the most important Anglophone moral philosophers of the 20th century. She pioneered a distinctive approach to philosophical treatment of ethics u
Represents the first comprehensive and accessible introduction to Foot's work, offering a complete chronological and thematic overview, emphasising the role Foot played in the development of contem
This volume focuses on controversial issues that stem from Philippa Foot’s later writings on natural goodness which are at the center of contemporary discussions of virtue ethics. The chapters address
