Disjunctivism

Disjunctivists argue that the objects we perceive, such as the tree in the church yard, are independent of our minds. So far so good. Yet they also hold that illusion and hallucination are possible. Can one hold both views together? Disjunctivists argue that we can, because they deny that genuine perception and hallucination are mental states of the same fundamental psychological kind, a view that has deep implications for philosophy of mind, metaphysics and epistemology.

This is the first book to introduce and assess this contested and much-discussed problem. Matthew Soteriou begins by explaining the views to which disjunctivism is opposed, such as sense-datum theories and intentionalist theories of perception. He then introduces and assesses:

• disjunctivism and the metaphysics of experience, explaining where disjunctivists disagree about experiential content of perceptions
• disjunctivism and perceptual knowledge, especially the work of John McDowell and his arguments in favour of disjunctivism
• disjunctivism and the phenomenal character of experience, including arguments for ‘naive realism’
• disjunctivism and demonstrative thought, including John Campbell and Bill Brewer’s arguments for a relational view of experience
• illusion and hallucination, especially the different kind of mental events associated with each.

A concluding chapter weighs up all the arguments in favour of disjunctivism and assesses which is the strongest. Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary this is an ideal starting point for anyone studying disjunctivism for the first time as well as more advanced students and researchers.

Matthew Soteriou is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick, UK. He is the author ofThe Mind's Construction: the ontology of mind and mental action (2013), and co-editor (with Lucy O'Brien) ofMental Actions (2009).